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SUPREME 
COURT WATCH 
By Reginald C. Oh 
On June 26, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24 72 (2003 ), a landmark Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process deci-
sion. By a 6-3 vote, the Court overruled its ruling in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S.186 (1986), and declared unconstitutional a 
Texas anti-sodomy statute criminalizing consensual sexual con-
duct between persons of the same sex. 
In Lawrence, Houston, Texas police officers were dis-
patched to a private residence in response to a reported distur-
bance. Upon entering the apartment, the police officers ob-
served petitioners John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner 
engaging in a sexual act. The officers arrested the two petition-
ers, held them in custody overnight, and then charged them 
with violating Texas Penal Code§ 21.06(a), which provided: 
"A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual 
intercourse with another individual of the same sex." The 
statute defined "deviate sexual intercourse" as "any contact be-
tween any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or 
anus of another person .... "At trial, the trial court rejected the 
petitioners challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. Pe-
titioners entered a plea of nolo contendere, were fined $200, and 
assessed court costs of $141.25. 
Petitioners appealed their convictions, contending that 
their convictions under the Texas anti-sodomy statute violat-
ed their federal equal protection and due process rights. The 
Texas Criminal Court of Appeals rejected the constitutional 
arguments and affirmed their convictions. Petitioners appealed 
the state court ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, which grant-
ed certiorari in the case. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, held 
that the Texas anti-sodomy statute, by criminalizing adult con-
sensual sexual conduct, violated the petitioners' vital interests in 
liberty and privacy as protected by the substantive due process 
doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment.Justice O'Connor 
concurred in the judgment, writing separately to contend that 
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the statute violated equal protection rather than substantive 
due process. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas, wrote the dissenting opinion. 
In reaching its holding, the Court took pains to explicitly 
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, a 1986 decision in which the 
Court had upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy statute. In that case, 
the Court rejected the argument that the statute violated sub-
stantive due process, reasoning that there was no "fundamental 
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Accordingly, the 
Bowers Court declared that since the Georgia anti-sodomy law 
did not infringe upon a fundamental right or liberty interest, the 
statute needed only to be subject to minimal judicial scrutiny, 
and the Court upheld the statute as rationally related to advanc-
ing a legitimate state interest. 
In Lawrence, however, in striking down the Texas anti-
sodomy statute, the Court asserted, "Bowers was not correct 
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to 
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and 
now is overruled." 123 S. Ct. at 2484. Although the Court 
clearly overruled Bowers, what is not clear is exactly how the 
Court overruled Bowers. Did the Lawrence Court, for example, 
declare the "right to engage in homosexual sodomy" a funda-
mental right? In dissent, Justice Scalia noted, "[W]hile over-
ruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves strangely un-
touched its central legal conclusion: 'Respondent would have 
us announce ... a fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy. This we are not willing to do.'" Id at 2488. 
Justice Scalia is partially correct. He is right because the 
Court explicitly refused to recognize the "right to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy" as a fundamental right. In fact, Kennedy re-
fused to frame the issue in Lawrence as whether there is a "fun-
damental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy," 
asserting that "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the 
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim 
the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married 
couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to 
have sexual intercourse." Id at 24 78. 
Instead, the Court recognized that a fundamental liberty in-
terest was at stake, but it formulated that liberty interest at a high-
er level of generality. For the majority, the doctrine of substantive 
due process protects the liberty interest of persons in being able 
to decide, free from government intrusion, "how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex." Id at 2480. 
For the majority, the Texas anti-sodomy statute was more 
than just an attempt to regulate sexual activity, but instead it 
was an attempt "to control a personal relationship" in which 
sexual contact between persons is but "one element in a per-
sonal bond that is ... enduring." Substantive due process pro-
tects the fundamental liberty interest of all persons, heterosex-
ual or homosexual, to be able to freely make the choice to enter 
into a personal relationship in which intimate sexual conduct is 
one part of that relationship. 
Thus, the Lawrence majority recognized that the liberty in-
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terest protected in earlier substantive due process cases is the 
freedom to make decisiom and choices in matters affecting a per-
son's autonomy and selfhood. In other words, what is consti-
tutionally impermissible about anti-sodomy laws is not that it 
criminalizes certain conduct, but that it criminalizes a person's 
decision or choice to engage in that conduct. 
The distinction between criminalizing the choice to engage 
in certain conduct as opposed to criminalizing the conduct it-
self is not just a semantic distinction. Rather, the distinction 
helps to understand what interests and rights are really at stake 
in substantive due process cases. For example, imagine a state 
passes a law that prohibits voters from voting for any Democ-
ratic candidate. Now, if we use the Bowers line of reasoning, if 
a person challenged the law as violation of substantive due 
process, the issue would be framed as, "Is there a fundamental 
right to vote for a Democrat?" It should be clear that to frame 
the issue this way is absurd. The problem here is not about the 
right to vote for a Democrat. The problem with such a law is 
that it interferes with the freedom to vote for any candidate of 
a person's choosing without interference from the state. Such 
a law infringes on a person's choices and decisions in such a way 
as to restrict that person's choices and decisions in such an im-
portant decision as how to exercise the right to vote. The right 
at stake, therefore, is the right to freely exercise choice when ex-
ercising the right to vote. 
Similarly, in Lawrence, the right at stake was not the "right 
to engage in homosexual sodomy." Rather, the right at stake 
was the fundamental right to freely exercise choice when de-
ciding to enter into personal relationships in which intimate 
sexual activity is an integral part of such relationships. Whether 
that choice involves entering into a relationship with a person 
of the same sex or opposite sex, the Court in Lawrence has con-
cluded that that decision is one that ought to be made by adult 
individuals without morally based state-imposed limitations 
on that choice. 
A question raised by Justice Scalia, however, is that ifin fact 
the majority has articulated a fundamental liberty interest "in 
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertain-
ing to sex," does the Lawrence decision now mean that laws 
based upon the identity of the partner-laws against adultery, 
fornication, and adult incest---are also unconstitutional? 
Arguably, there is a strong argument to be made that laws 
against fornication in particular are unconstitutional under 
Lawrence, since such laws do regulate the personal decisions to 
enter into personal relationships involving intimate sexual con-
duct. The holding in Lawrence, however, could be read to impli-
cate a fundamental liberty interest only or especially when the 
law regulates choices regarding personal relationships in which 
such choices reflect back upon the identity of the person mak-
ing such choices. In other words, the choice in Lawrence to 
enter into a same-sex personal relationship is intimately tied to 
the identity and selfhood of gays and lesbians, is intimately tied 
to the human process of self-definition. By contrast, the choice 
to engage in personal, intimate relations with an unmarried per-
son is not intimately tied to the person's identity and selfhood. 
Of course, the biggest issue raised by Lawrence is the status 
of marriage laws that prohibit same-sex marriages. Justice 
State & Local Law News, Volume 27, Number 2, Winter 2004 
Scalia contends that the Court's reasoning in Lawrence makes 
it inevitable that laws prohibiting same-sex marriages will be 
struck down on substantive due process grounds. Justice 
Kennedy, however, explicitly stated that its holding in 
Lawrence does not involve or implicate the question of whether 
"the government must give formal recognition to any relation-
ship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Id at 2484. 
Who is right? Does Lawrence pave the way for the eventu-
al constitutional protection of same-sex marriages? In brief, the 
Court could easily limit the reach of Lawrence by reasoning 
that anti-sodomy statutes involve the unconstitutional govern-
ment intrusion into the realm of private decision-making, 
whereas a ban on same-sex marriages does not involve unjus-
tifiable government intrusion into "a realm of private liberty," 
but instead, involves an entirely different question about the 
government's constitutional authority to formally recognize 
only certain types of unions. 
However, legal advocates could use Lawrence's holding 
under the substantive due process prong of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to craft an equal protection argument that denying 
gays and lesbians the right to marry discriminates on the basis 
of a fundamental liberty interest, and therefore laws banning 
same-sex marriage ought to be subject to strict scrutiny, and 
presumably, under such rigorous scrutiny, must be struck down. 
In any event, Lawrence will provide a new doctrinal weapon 
that legal advocates for gay and lesbian rights will use to ex-
pand rights for gays and lesbiansanditwillbe interesting to see 
how the courts grapple with the ambiguous but potentially far-
reaching implications of the Lawrence decision. 
Chair's Message 
(continued from page 2) 
member showing up to a meeting only once and not coming 
back again because the meeting didn't meet expectations. 
Warning: Once you show up in person, it will be hard to leave 
without receiving an opportunity to continue to contribute 
your time and talents to the Section. 
Special thanks, as always, to our outstanding Section 
staff-Jackie Baker and Alice Bare-who make everything 
that the Section leadership touches look good! Linda Castilla 
and Lori Nicoll, meeting staff at the New York State Bar As-
sociation, deserve our admiration and thanks for a wonderful 
joint Fall Meeting with the Municipal Law Section of the 
New York State Bar Association. Thanks also to the NYS 
Bar's Committee on Attorneys in Public Service who hosted 
an outstanding reception for us at the Governor's Mansion. 
As always, the volunteer leadership of the State and Local 
Government Law Section remains committed to keeping our 
Section relevant and to providing value to all of our members. 
Your ideas, suggestions, and advice are always welcome. 
Best wishes for a happy and healthy new year! 
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